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Abstract 
 
Security is a significant concern for many sensor network 
applications. Intrusion detection is one method of 
defending against attacks. However, standard intrusion 
detection is not suitable for sensor networks with limited 
battery power, memory and processing resources. This 
paper compares several approaches to intrusion 
detection in sensor networks.  We investigate accuracy of 
detecting attacks, versus energy efficiency. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sensor networks are developed for deployment at 
locations without infrastructure support. It may provide a 
solution to many applications, for example traffic, 
environment and pollution monitoring [1], [2].  
With this purpose there are strong restrictions on 
energy consumption, computing resources and memory 
size. It is also important to keep cost per unit as low as 
possible [3].  
Security of sensor networks is limited by wireless 
nature, network structure and resources. It is expected 
that the network is flexible and adaptable to the addition 
of new nodes, and provide for routing changes in the 
event of node failure. The most critical aspect of sensor 
network application is energy efficiency [4], [5], [6], [7]. 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects a security 
violation on a system by monitoring and analyzing 
network activity. There are two approaches: misuse 
detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection 
identifies an unauthorized use from signatures while 
anomaly detection identifies from analysis of an event. 
When both techniques detect violation; they raise an 
alarm signal to warn the system [8], [9], [10], [11]. 
Related Work The distributed monitor was 
first developed by Kachirski and Guha in the context of 
Intrusion Detection Using Mobile Agents in Wireless Ad 
Hoc Networks [12].  Our implementation of the 
distributed defense method is largely based on their 
approach.  Newcome and et al. also discuss security in 
sensor network [6], [13], [14]. 
Contributions This paper investigates new 
approaches to intrusion detection, based on the layout and 
selection of monitoring nodes.  In the default, every 
sensor node in the network could monitor, but this makes 
for poor energy efficiency. An analysis is based on the 
response of intrusion detection nodes, number of required 
alert messages and intruder detection ability.  We also 
explore these in the context of different size of network 
clusters.  
 
2. Intrusion Detection System 
 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) uses either anomaly 
detection or misuse detection. This paper uses a decision 
mechanism derived from Siraj and et al. [10], [15], [16]. 
Within IDS, tasks are combined to minimize energy 
consumption. So, anomaly detection is proceeding while 
event data is pre-checked for misuse detection. The 
signature records are combined to a single database to 
reduce memory use. In the normal situation, both systems 
operate with same record. 
Event Data  is the network activities (for example 
number of success and failure of authentication). This set 
of data is prepared for further analysis. 
Misuse Detection analyses event data from signature 
record. In case of event data is matched with any rules, 
alert signal will be raised. Otherwise, event data is 
forwarded to anomaly detection for further analysis. 
Anomaly Detection  compares event data with 
signature record to find harmful attacks from intruder. If 
probability reaches the risk threshold, alert signal will be 
raised.   
Signature Record is a database which contains 
signature of unauthorized and high risk activities. In 
addition, each record contains level of harm for misuse 
detection and probability chance for anomaly detection. 
Alert is an interface between operating system and 
IDS. Duties of alert are broadcasting alarm and alert 
information. 
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 3. Selection of intrusion detection nodes  
 
In this paper, three strategies have been investigated. 
These are core defense, distributed defense and boundary 
defense. Each of these strategies operates within a cluster 
of nodes. 
Core defense involves selecting IDS nodes around a 
centre point. It assures that no intruders break into a 
central station in each cluster. This model defends from 
the most inner point then strikes back to the outer area. 
Boundary defense selects nodes along a boundary at 
the perimeter of the cluster. It focuses on preventing an 
intruder from breaking into the cluster from outside the 
cluster.   
Distributed defense has an agent node selection 
algorithm which is developed from the voting algorithm 
[12].    IDS node selection follows a tree hierarchy. A 
voting system is employed [13], [14]. 
    The voting algorithm for the selection of nodes in 
distributed defense consists of 4 steps:  vote preparation, 
voting, vote counting and activate IDS. There are two 
parameters in this algorithm. First, number of hop count 
determines the threshold of selection for the number of 
hops between a candidate node and itself. A larger hop 
count means less activated nodes and each IDS node has 
to take responsibility for more nodes. Second, the voting 
threshold is the minimum number of votes before 
activating IDS. The procedure lets each node elect its 
own gateway. The stages are:  
1. Vote Preparation: Each node decides their gateway 
or nearest node. A hop count parameter determines 
distance between agent node and neighboring nodes.  
2. Voting: Each node transmits their vote message to 
their gateway. 
3. Vote Counting: To count a received vote.  
4. Activate IDS: If the number of votes exceeds the 
threshold, then activates IDS. The node will remain 
active until timeout, at which point the process 1-4 
will be commenced again. 
 
4. Simulation 
 
We set up a simulation to analyze the three defense 
models. A network topology has been created with a 
central station at a centre point in each cluster. Only 
designated nodes operate to monitor traffic. There are 3 
defense strategies; boundary, distributed and core 
defense. Table 1 shows a number of simulated attacks 
with the various node selection approaches. The 
simulation covers 10-80 nodes in each cluster and 
simulates 3 types of defenses. In the results, it shows a 
number of alarm messages and active nodes. This also 
represents the energy consumption. 
In simulation, we develop IDS nodes in Ptolemy 
software which includes a sensor network package. In 
this package, it contains a sensor network operation and 
communication component.  So, we create IDS software 
which performs on top of sensor network operation and 
voting function for distributed defense. Then, we set up 
attack messages which trick nodes into reading wrong 
sensing data. In message contents, we follow the rules of 
communication messages but modify some contents and 
format at random times. Therefore attacker transmits near 
real communication message which report inaccurate 
sensing data. The numbers of attackers are based on 
simulation models and cluster sizes. 
IDS mechanism detects unusual behavior from 
incorrect format. In case an incorrect packet is not related 
to transmission error (for example an incorrect node id), it 
raises an alarm signal to prepare for intruders. Then a 
group of activated nodes will be surrounded the intruders 
to protect from breaking into network.  
A scenario with same cluster size used the same 
deployment for the result consistency. The nodes have 
been deployed randomly for each different cluster size as 
shown in Fig. 3. The result also has been evaluated from 
average outcome from each scenario as in Table 1. 
 
5. Analysis 
 
According to the results, when there are less than 20 
nodes in a cluster, it shows a good detection rate while 
alert numbers shows no difference in all strategies. An 
alert node is a neighbor node which receives alert  
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Node without IDS active Monitoring Coverage 
 
 
 Figure 2. Agent node selection in tree hierarchy 
 
Table 1. Simulation result from core attack 
Total Node Type of Defence IDS nodes when Alarm No. of broadcast Alarm Message
10 core 10 109
20 core 19 239
40 core 27 599
80 core 29 1239
10 voting 8 109
20 voting 16 419
40 voting 27 1639
80 voting 55 3298
10 border 10 89
20 border 18 339
40 border 10 639
80 border 20 1429
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message from agent node, and then activates its IDS 
software to prepare for attack. In the attack, the broadcast 
messages increase when the number of nodes increases. 
When number of nodes is greater than 20, the alert 
messages increases dramatically in an exponential curve. 
The distributed defense results in a broadcast of 
approximately 300% more messages than the core 
defense with 80 nodes as shown in Fig. 4 (a). So, the 
energy consumption at alert time is increasing as the 
cluster size increases. The reason that distributed defense 
has more alert messages is agent node selection spreads 
the selected nodes over the area. So, selected nodes cover 
more area than other strategies, and have more neighbor 
nodes. Since an alert message goes to a number of 
neighbors, the greater coverage results in more alert 
messages being broadcast. Fig. 4 (a) shows the number of 
messages generated. Fig. 4 (b) shows a ratio of the 
number of alerted nodes and the total number of nodes in 
the network. 
In the core defense strategy, the ratio drops 
dramatically when the number of node increases. Also, at 
80 nodes, boundary and inner area attack drop under 0.1. 
However, core defense is not able to detect a boundary 
attack and inner area attack in large cluster size. Since, an 
agent node has not spread to outer or covers a border line. 
Therefore its alert node ratio drops down for a larger 
cluster. Energy consumption in core defense is very low 
when number node is increasing. However, it suffers 
from false negatives. 
The boundary defense also demonstrates ratio 
reduction in a large network cluster. However, boundary 
attack on large cluster has not reduced in the same 
manner as inner or core attack because it has more 
opportunity to detect intruder on border line with 
boundary defense. As shown in Fig. 4 (d), the number of 
nodes is increasing but the alert node ratio is decreasing. 
Therefore average energy consumption is reduced when 
cluster size is larger but the tradeoff is false negatives in 
core and inner attack. 
Table 2 shows a response of each attacks and defenses. 
The result shows the weaknesses of core defense which 
boundary and inner attack are missed. Boundary defense 
misses on core and inner attack in large cluster. While 
distributed defense always detects an attack on different 
part of network cluster. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Activating every node to operate IDS software, wastes 
energy. Consequently, it is important to minimize the 
number of selected nodes to run intrusion detection. We 
consider three approaches. The boundary defense has 
strong response in border line and core defense is strong 
in core area. Distributed defense can respond equally to 
entire network but number of broadcast alert message is 
the highest.  
According to the results, a small cluster size can 
manage with all defense strategies and provide no 
difference in energy consumption. In large cluster size, 
each defense model has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. However, distributed defense is energy 
intensive for large clusters. The simpler schemes of 
boundary and core defense are much more economical in 
their use of energy. However, they are vulnerable to 
attack from within the cluster. 
 
7. Conclusion and Future work 
 
Boundary defense reduces the number of IDS nodes. It 
also keeps broadcast alert messages to a minimum. 
However, when intruder attacks on core area or inner 
part, it shows a large number of false negatives in a larger 
cluster.  
The least number of broadcast messages is for core 
defense. However, this has limited coverage. Core 
defense has strong defense in the inner network. The 
broadcast message is largely as same as boundary 
defense. This strategy has to wait for intruder to reach the 
core area then it raises alert signal to strike back. 
However, boundary attack and inner area have 
weaknesses, and a node can be captured without notice. 
Distributed defense has developed from agent node 
selection algorithm which spreads an agent to entire 
network area. It is able to respond to all attackers from 
small to a large cluster. However, the weakness is the 
sharply increasing of alert messages when cluster size is 
 
Figure 3. Node deployment (greyed node is IDS activated) 
 
Table 2. Table shows results of defense for each attack and 
cluster size. (O is Detected; X is Missed) 
  
Total Node Type of Defense 
Core Attack Inner Attack Boundary 
Attack 
Core O O O 
Distributed O O O 
 
10 
Border O O O 
Core O O O 
Distributed O O O 
 
20 
Border O O O 
Core O O X 
Distributed O O O 
 
40 
Border X O O 
Core O X X 
Distributed O O O 
 
80 
Border X X O 
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larger. To improve detection performance, we pay a high 
penalty in energy consumption. 
Given the complementary advantages of the two 
schemes, it is natural to think of hybrid schemes that 
combine the best attributes. Future work will consider a 
dynamic defense strategy of agent node in environment to 
suit each particular situation. Given that nodes can turn 
on IDS fairly quickly, it is natural to consider adaptive 
strategies in responding to the threat as it develops. 
However there is the disadvantage of added coordination 
costs.  We investigate whether a dynamic approach is 
superior to static defense. 
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Figure 4. (a) Number of alert message in each defense. (b) Ratio energy in activating alert nodes and total nodes in distributed defense  
(c) Ratio energy in activating alert nodes and total nodes in core defense.  (d) Ratio energy in activating alert nodes and total nodes in boundary defense.    
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